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Abstract
This paper compares the behavior of subjects’ uncertainty in different mon-
etary policy environments when forecasting inflation in the laboratory. We find
that inflation targeting produces lower uncertainty and higher accuracy of interval
forecasts than inflation forecast targeting. We also establish several stylized facts
about the behavior of individual uncertainty, aggregate distribution of forecasts,
and disagreement between individuals. We find that the average confidence inter-
val is the measure that performs best in forecasting inflation uncertainty. Subjects
correctly perceive the underlying inflation uncertainty in only 60% of cases and
tend to report asymmetric confidence intervals, perceiving higher uncertainty with
respect to inflation increases.
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1 Introduction
This paper discusses an experimental study on the expectation formation process and
the associated uncertainty within a macroeconomic framework. The importance of infla-
tion uncertainty has been recognized at least since Friedman’s Nobel Lecture (Friedman,
1977). Friedman argued that higher rates of inflation are associated with higher inflation
variability, which in turn causes a reduction in the effi ciency of the price system and leads
to a reduction in output due to institutional rigidities. Indeed, Levi and Makin (1980) and
Mullineaux (1980) found empirical support for Friedman’s conjecture. This represents
a clear rationale for central banks to care about inflation uncertainty. Moreover, infla-
tion targeting central banks, in particular, trust that inflation expectations of economic
agents can be importantly shaped by their communication strategies. Both individual
uncertainty and disagreement (interpersonal uncertainty) can be viewed as measures of
the effectiveness of their communication strategies. In his speech about Federal Reserve
communications, Mishkin (2008) stressed that the cost of inflation should be viewed both
in terms of its level and of its uncertainty. As Giordani and Söderlind (2003) demonstrate
this is particularly relevant when there is a regime switch (see also Evans and Wachtel,
1993). More generally, this is consistent with the standard New Keynesian dynamic sto-
chastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model, in which a central bank should minimize the
variation of inflation in order to maximize consumer welfare (see e.g., Woodford, 2003).1
In our experiment, subjects (undergraduate students) are introduced to a fictitious
economy described by series of inflation, interest rates and the output gap. They are
asked to forecast inflation and to provide 95% confidence intervals around their point
forecasts. These forecasts are then fed into the simplified version of the New Keynesian
model, which then generates realizations for inflation, the output gap and interest rates.
These values are displayed to subjects and the process is iterated. This allows us to study
both individual uncertainty about forecasts and disagreement on the point forecasts.2
1Recognizing the importance of different aspects of expectation distribution, Lorenzoni (2010) shows
that monetary policy affects agents (with different pieces of information) differently, arguing that there
is a tradeoff between aggregate and cross-sectional effi ciency.
2Our companion paper (Pfajfar and Žakelj, 2011) focuses on the inflation expectation formation
mechanism and its relation to monetary policy, i.e., how monetary policy should be designed in order to
2
In many respects it would be more desirable to study the responses of professional
forecasters. They take economic decisions based on their forecasts and affect financial
markets and the economy. However, there are clear advantages of using experimental
data. We can: (i) observe how the forecasts interact with the fictitious model of the
economy and different monetary policy regime, as we know the underlying model and the
information set of survey respondents; (ii) analyze different policy regimes and different
risk attitudes; (iii) have independent responses not affected by consensus opinion.
We focus on the relationship between monetary policy and inflation uncertainty and
examine whether some environments are better than others at stabilizing inflation and
minimize uncertainty. Two different monetary policy rules are evaluated: inflation tar-
geting and inflation forecast targeting. For the latter we use three different specifications
of the coeffi cient that describes the reaction of interest rates to deviations of inflation
forecasts from the inflation target. We find that the monetary policy design significantly
affects both the width and the accuracy of forecast intervals. In particular, the instrumen-
tal rule that reacts to current inflation reduces uncertainty and increases subjects’forecast
accuracy compared to rules that react to expected inflation. Most of these differences can
be attributed to the fact that certain monetary policy regimes result in lower variability
of inflation than others. The contemporaneous rule (inflation targeting) produces a lower
variability in actual inflation than inflation forecast treatments. Also treatments where
the central bank reacts more strongly to deviations in inflation expectations from the
inflation target result in lower inflation variability compared to the inflation forecasting
regime with the baseline calibration. However, there are some treatment effects that go
beyond this channel. Similar evidence is observed for different aggregate measures of
uncertainty.
Different measures have been used in the survey data literature to proxy inflation
uncertainty: the standard deviation of point forecasts, the average individual uncertainty,
the interquartile range of the aggregate distribution of inflation forecasts (IQR), the
average individual forecast error variance, and the variance of the aggregate distribution.
be robust to the potential presence of heterogeneous expectations.
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Which of these representations of the distribution of inflation expectations is most relevant
for the monetary authority?3 Our analysis will mostly focus on the first three measures,
since they are usually regarded as complementary in terms of informative value. For
example, the first describes disagreement but says little about uncertainty, and the second
captures uncertainty but disregards disagreement. Variance of the aggregate distribution
of forecasts gives information about both uncertainty and disagreement. We find that
average confidence intervals perform best in the forecasting exercise, although simple
correlation analysis shows that the IQR is the measure that has the highest correlation
with the variability of inflation.
When looking at individual responses we also find that forecasters usually tend to
underestimate the underlying uncertainty when forecasting inflation, as only 60% of the
results fall within the specified 95% intervals. That subjects tend to report narrower
confidence intervals than that asked for is a well-known fact, labelled the "overconfi-
dence effect." Several dynamic panel data regressions have been designed to identify the
determinants of the measures discussed above. The results of an analysis of individual
confidence intervals suggest that the width of the confidence interval is highly inertial
and, interestingly, it increases only when inflation is below the target level. However,
our results show little evidence of different degrees of uncertainty in different phases of
the business cycle. Disagreement among subjects measured with the standard deviation
of point forecasts increases when the average group forecast error increases and when
inflation is below the target level. Absolute forecast error and inflation also affect indi-
vidual uncertainty although disagreement is arguably less inertial. All the factors that
significantly affect the specification of uncertainty and disagreement are by definition also
important for the interquartile range. Indeed, inflation, the mean forecast error and the
lagged interquartile range exert significant effects.
There are several reasons why asking subjects for symmetric intervals might be prefer-
3The forecasting ability of different measures has mostly been examined using the survey data of
professional forecasters, see e.g., Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) and Giordani and Söderlind (2003).
See Engelberg, Manski, and Williams (2009) for some methodological issues involved. Zarnowitz and
Lambros (1987), for example, show that there can be substantial differences between the variation in
disagreement and the variation in uncertainty (for US survey of professional forecasters).
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able to asking for potentially asymmetric intervals. Symmetric intervals are easier to
handle in empirical analysis when the aim is to construct the aggregate distribution of
expectations, because it can simply be assumed that an individual’s distribution is nor-
mally distributed. Furthermore, there are no model based reasons why confidence intervals
should not be symmetric, as the underlying model and the distribution of shocks do not
exhibit any asymmetries. We have decided to perform treatments with a restriction to
symmetric confidence intervals (we call them "Sym"), and treatments where we allow
subjects to have potentially asymmetric intervals (we call them "Asym"). For the latter
case, we find that only 12.5% of reported confidence intervals are symmetric. There is
less asymmetry when there is an upward path of the output gap (expansion) and when
inflation is below the target level.
Individual uncertainty and disagreement have not been extensively studied in eco-
nomics using experimental data.4 Forecasting uncertainty has attracted a lot of atten-
tion among psychologists, however, their approach has substantially different focus than
ours.5 Psychology literature usually limits its attention to independent event forecasts,
while the present study concentrates on a series of (dependent) forecasts. This allows us
to perform a time-series analysis of confidence bounds. We also provide subjects with
other relevant information (besides the past history of prices) that might influence con-
fidence. In this way we are able to examine whether confidence intervals are affected by
the different designs of monetary policy.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model and the experimental
design; in Section 3 we focus on the analysis of the individual responses while in Section 4
we analyze disagreement and the properties of aggregate distribution; Section 5 assesses
the forecasting ability of different measures, while Section 6 concludes.
4Fehr and Tyran (2008) ask subjects to provide descriptive measures of their confidence level (but
do not perform any analysis of them), while we ask subjects to provide numerical responses. Similarly,
Bottazzi and Devetag (2005) ask subjects to provide 95% confidence intervals in an asset pricing experi-
ment, with the aim (almost exclusively) of defining the average forecast but not of studying the behavior
of uncertainty or disagreement.
5A common approach in this experimantal literature is to frame the question in the context of stock
market forecasting exercises. For surveys, see Hoffrage (2004) or Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips
(1982) (see also e.g., Oskamp, 1965, Lawrence and O’Connor, 1992, Muradoglu and Onkal, 1994, Gilovich,
Griffi n, and Kahneman, 2002). These studies do not usually provide payment for the accuracy or the
width of the confidence intervals, only for the accuracy of the point forecasts.
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2 Experimental design
We design an experiment where subjects participate in a fictitious economy and are
asked to provide inflation forecasts and a measure of uncertainty about their forecasts.
The mean of the point forecasts is then used by the data generating process to calculate
inflation, the interest rate, and the output gap. These variables are available to subjects
before the next period forecast. Such so-called "learning to forecast" experiments have
been conducted before within a simple macroeconomic setup (e.g., Williams, 1987; Ma-
rimon, Spear, and Sunder, 1993; Evans, Honkapohja, and Marimon, 2001; Arifovic and
Sargent, 2003) and also within the asset pricing framework (see Hommes, Sonnemans,
Tuinstra, and van de Velden, 2005 and Anufriev and Hommes, 2012). Closest to our
framework, but with a different focus, are experiments by Adam (2007) and Assenza,
Heemeijer, Hommes, and Massaro (2011). In this paper we have decided to focus on the
reduced form of the New Keynesian (NK) model, where we can clearly observe forecasts
and study their relationship with monetary policy.
Of course, there is a trade-off between using the model from "first principles" and
employing a reduced form as in the learning to forecast literature. The former has the
advantage of setting the objectives (payoff function) exactly in line with the microfoun-
dations (see Noussair, Pfajfar, and Zsiros, 2011). In such approach, however, it is diffi cult
to elicit forecasts since subjects act as producers and consumers and interact on the labor
and final product markets and do not explicitly provide their forecasts.6 We first present
the model and then focus on the design.
The data generating process is a forward-looking sticky price NK monetary model
with different monetary policy reaction functions.7 The model consists of a forward-
6The argument is similar to that in papers by Marimon and Sunder, where the same tradeoff was
first recognized. In this framework, thus, we do not assign subjects a particular role in the economy,
rather they act as "professional" forecasters. One way to think about the relation between "professional
forecasters" and consumers/firms is that these economic subjects employ professional forecasters to
provide them with forecasts of inflation and associated uncertainty.
7The advantage of this small-scale NK model is that it reproduces relatively well several stylized
facts about major economies and is the simplest model that is widely used for policy analysis. However,
it requires forecasting two periods ahead. It would definitely be easier for participants to produce a
one-period-ahead forecast (sometimes called "nowcasting"). The second drawback is that in standard
NK models agents have to forecast both inflation and the output gap. We have decided to simplify this
experiment by asking only for expectations of inflation.
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looking Phillips curve (PC), an IS curve, and a monetary policy reaction function.8 The
information set at the time of forecasting consists of macro variables at time t−1, although
the forecasts are made in period t for period t + 1. Mathematically we denote this as
Et (πt+1|It−1), or simply Etπt+1. In the experiment we calculate it as 1K
∑k πkt+1|t, where
πkt+1|t is subject k’s point forecast of inflation (K is the total number of subjects in the
economy). The IS curve is specified as follows:
yt = −ϕ (it − Etπt+1) + yt−1 + gt, (1)
where it is the interest rate, πt denotes inflation, yt is the output gap, and gt is an
exogenous shock. The parameter ϕ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution in
demand. We calibrate it to 0.164.9 It can be observed that we do not have expectations
of the output gap in the specification. Instead, we have a lagged output gap.10 Compared
to purely forward-looking specifications, our model might display more persistence in
the output gap. This is the most significant departure from the otherwise standard
macroeconomic model. The supply side of the economy is summarized in the following
PC:
πt = λyt + βEtπt+1 + ut. (2)
The longer prices are fixed on average, i.e., the smaller λ is, the less sensitive inflation
is to the current output gap. The parameter β is the subjective discount rate. We set
λ = 0.3 and β = 0.99. The shocks gt and ut are uncorrelated and unobservable to subjects
and follow an AR(1) process: gt = κgt−1 + g̃t; ut = νut−1 + ũt, where 0 < |κ| , |ν| < 1.




and ũt v N (0, σ2u). In the NK
literature it is standard to assume AR(1) shocks. In particular, κ and ν are calibrated to
0.6, while their standard deviations are 0.08. The treatments are fully comparable as we
8Detailed derivations can be found in, e.g., textbooks such as Walsh (2003) or Woodford (2003).
9We implement McCallum and Nelson’s (1999) calibration.
10In principle, one could argue that this specification of the IS equation corresponds to the case when
subjects have naive expectations on the output gap or an extreme case of habit persistence is assumed.
We were afraid that if we asked ubjects to forecast both inflation and the output gap this would represent
a too diffi cult task for them (particularly given that they have to forecast for two periods ahead).
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have exactly the same shocks in all treatments.11
Monetary policy reaction functions define four different types of treatments: three
with (i) inflation forecast targeting (eq. 3) and different levels of γ, and one with (ii)
inflation targeting (eq. 4):
it = γ (Etπt+1 − π) + π, (3)
it = γ (πt − π) + π. (4)
The central bank responds to deviations of forecasted inflation or of contemporaneous
inflation from the target, π. In order to have inflation in positive numbers for most
of the periods, we set the inflation target to π = 3. The aggressiveness of the central
bank’s response is determined by the reaction coeffi cient γ. A higher γ implies a stronger
stabilizing effect of the Taylor-type monetary policy rule.
There are eight treatments in our experiment, depending on a monetary policy regime
and a type of the confidence interval input. Treatments where subjects are asked to pro-
vide a symmetric confidence interval are denoted as Sym-p, where p represents one of the
four monetary policy regimes. Subjects report the difference from their point forecast,
which is roughly equivalent to 1.96 standard errors of their expectation, assuming it is
represented by a normal distribution. Treatments where subjects are not restricted to
symmetric confidence intervals are denoted as Asym-p, p = 1, . . . , 4. In this set of treat-
ments, subjects have to report the upper and the lower bound of their forecast together
with their mean forecast, so that we do not restrict individuals to report symmetric con-
fidence intervals (in both treatments we ask them to report 95% confidence intervals).
Table 1 provides a summary.
Insert Table 1 about here
11gt could be justified as government spending shocks or taste shocks and the standard interpretation
of ut is the technology shock. The empirical literature finds these shocks to be quite persistent (see e.g.
Cooley and Prescott, 1995 or Ireland, 2004). The introduction of shocks as an exogenous unobservable
component in the law of motion for observable variables is an important source of uncertainty in our
experiment. It helps to avoid outcomes where all agents would implicitly coordinate on the forecasts
identical to the inflation target and maintains the focus on the process of learning to forecast.
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As said, three different levels of γ are tested in our experiment. We chose γ = 1.5 as
our baseline specification in line with the majority of empirical findings and the initial
proposal of Taylor in 1993. Our key interest is in seeing how subjects react to more (γ = 4)
and less (γ = 1.35) aggressive interest rate policies and how these polices influence the
uncertainty of their forecasts (see Section 3). A detailed discussion of the treatment
selection regarding monetary policy and stability properties of the respective models
can be found in our companion paper (Pfajfar and Žakelj, 2011), where we focus on
questions regarding the performance of different monetary policy rules and their impact
on expectations (point forecasts). However, let us point out that all treatments are
determinate and E-stable under rational expectations. In our analysis we sometimes
group all symmetric and asymmetric treatments together. We refer to treatments Sym-
1, . . . , Sym-4 as Sym, and to treatments Asym-1, . . . , Asym-4 as Asym.
2.1 Experimental procedures
The experimental subjects participate in a simulated economy of 9 agents.12 The par-
ticipants were enlisted through a recruitment program for undergraduate students at the
Universitat Pompeu Fabra and the University of Tilburg. The experiment consists of
24 independent groups of 9 subjects, 216 subjects in total. Each subject was randomly
assigned to one group only. They earn on average around €15, depending on the treat-
ments and individual performance. The participants receive detailed instructions (here
attached in Appendix E) and a quiz questionnaire, and play 5 practice rounds before the
start of the experiment to make sure they fully understand their task. The program is
written in Z-Tree experimental software (Fischbacher, 2007).
The subjects are presented with a simple fictitious economy setup. As shown above,
the economy is described by three macroeconomic variables: inflation, the output gap and
the interest rate. The participants observe time series of these variables and their past
forecasts, up to the period t−1. They do not observe the forecasts of other individuals or
12The common view among experimental economists is that it is not necessary to have many subjects
in microfounded experiments. Most learning to forecast experiments are conducted with 5-6 subjects,
e.g. Hommes, Sonnemans, Tuinstra, and van de Velden (2005), Adam (2007), Fehr and Tyran (2008).
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their performance. 10 initial values are generated by the computer under the assumption
of rational expectations. The subjects’task is to provide inflation forecasts for the period
t + 1 with a 95% confidence interval. Confidence intervals do not influence outcomes.
The underlying model of the economy is qualitatively described to them. We explain
the meaning and relevance of the main macroeconomic variables and inform them that
their decisions have an impact on the output, inflation and interest rate realized at time
t. This is the predominant strategy in learning to forecast experiments (see Duffy, 2008,
and Hommes, 2011).13 Each session consists of 70 periods.
After each period subjects receive information about the inflation realized in that
period, their prediction of it, and the payoff they have gained. The payoff function is the
sum of two convex components. The first component depends on their forecast errors,
while the second depends on the width of their confidence interval.















 1 if CI ≥ f0 if otherwise , f =
∣∣πt − πkt+1|t∣∣ .
The first component,W1, depends on their forecast errors and is designed to encourage
subjects to give accurate point forecasts. It gives subjects a payoff if their forecast
errors, f , are smaller than 4. The second component, W2, depends on the width of their
confidence interval and is intended to motivate subjects to think about the variance of
the actual inflation since it is more rewarding when it is lower. There is thus a trade-off
between the width of this interval and its accuracy. A similar functional form of the
13In learning to forecast experiments it is not possible to achieve a REE (Rational Expectations
Equilibrium) simply by introspection. This holds even if we provide subjects with the data generating
process, as there exists uncertainty over how other participants forecast, so subjects have to engage in a
number of trial and error exercises or in other words adaptive learning. It has been analytically proven
in Marcet and Sargent (1989) and further formalized in a series of papers by Evans and Honkapohja (see
their book: Evans and Honkapohja, 2001) that it is enough that agents observe all the relevant variables
in the economy (as in our case, where they are specifically instructed that all of them might be relevant)
and update their forecasts according to the adaptive learning algorithm (their errors) for them to end
up in the REE. This has been acknowledged also in Duffy (2008) and Hommes (2011).
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payoff function is used in Adam (2007). The CI is either equal to the subjects’point
estimate of their confidence interval or half of the difference between the upper and lower
bounds. The subjects receive a reward if their confidence intervals, CI, are not larger
than ±4 percentage points,14 conditional on the fact that actual inflation falls in the given
interval: CI ≥
∣∣∣πt − πkt+1|t∣∣∣. With this setup we restrict to positive payoffs.
Prior to running the experiments we investigated alternative designs of the payoff
function W2. Desirable payoff functions should maximize the forecaster’s utility at con-
fidence intervals giving some fixed proportion of the forecast uncertainty distribution.
Confidence intervals are more informative when they encompass a relatively high propor-
tion of forecaster’s uncertainty distribution. We therefore decided to aim for the interval
that includes (roughly) 95% of the inflation forecast uncertainty distribution. It is diffi -
cult, however, to specify and calibrate a payoff function that is maximized at the required
proportion of the inflation forecast uncertainty distribution and is at the same time easily
understandable to the subjects. Furthermore, subjects may use alternative forecasting
models for point predictions with different distribution variances. As shocks are not di-
rectly observable in our experiment, the relevant benchmark to study the properties of
the payoff function is the restrictive perception equilibrium, which is of the same form
as the rational expectation equilibrium, except that agents do not observe the shocks.
Under this expectation formation mechanism the payoff function that has been chosen is
maximized when providing 89 − 94% confidence intervals, depending on the policy rule
implemented. In Appendix D, our payoff function W2 is studied in detail.
3 Individual uncertainty
While the distribution of means across subjects captures interpersonal variation, confi-
dence bounds help us to approximate individual uncertainty of future inflation. Zarnowitz
and Lambros (1987) show that there can be substantial differences between the variation
in disagreement and the variation in average uncertainty in US Survey of Professional
Forecasters (SPF). Therefore, both might not be appropriate measures for forecasting
14This constraint was almost never binding (see Figure 1). In only 0.98% cases this was violated.
11
inflation uncertainty. The current section concentrates on individual uncertainty, while
the next section investigates the aggregate distribution of forecasts and disagreement. In
both sections a clear emphasis is posed on the behavior of these measures across different
designs of monetary policy.
Insert Figure 1 about here
Figure 1 displays the distribution of all confidence interval forecasts. The range of
responses for confidence intervals is between 0 and 8.3, although it should be noted that
responses larger than 4 do not result in any payoff (0.98% of all cases). The average
symmetrical confidence interval is 0.61, with an average standard deviation of 0.28. Al-
lowing for asymmetrical confidence bounds across all policy regimes we obtain an average
lower part of the confidence interval of 0.37 with an average standard deviation of 0.19,
while the average upper part of the confidence interval equals 0.41 with an average stan-
dard deviation of 0.28. There are considerable differences across treatments as the lowest
symmetrical (asymmetrical lower, upper) average interval in treatments Sym (treatments
Asym) is 0.41 (0.24, 0.27) and the highest is 0.91 (0.47, 0.53). Evidence of rounding is
present in responses 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, and 3 as they have significantly higher frequencies than
other responses. Overall, 13% of responses are integers, while the majority are to one
decimal point accuracy, 77%. The remaining responses are to 2 decimal point accuracy.
Insert Table 2 about here
The average confidence intervals in all treatments are listed in Table 2, while a per-
group summary is presented in Table 3. In general, confidence intervals are narrower in
treatments Asym than in treatments Sym at 1% significance using nonparametric tests
(Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney). In Section 3.1 we show that treatments Sym and Asym also
differ in the forecast accuracy of subjects’interval predictions. The factors that determine
the differences in confidence intervals are discussed in Section 3.2.15
15Our results might not be directly comparable to those based on surveys. Probabilistic forecasts
in surveys are usually collected in terms of histograms where intervals are predefined and fixed for all
participants. Another difference between our experiment and surveys concerns the risk attitude and the
horizon of the forecasts. With professional forecasters it can be claimed that their probability and point
forecasts are correlated. In our experiment, subjects could neither exchange information about each
other’s expectations, nor is the average aggregate prediction directly observable.
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3.1 Monetary policy, individual uncertainty, and forecasting ac-
curacy
We have the opportunity to compare the results with the underlying uncertainty that we
have embedded in our set-up. In Appendix D we calculate, for all policy rules, confidence
intervals that maximize the payoffs under rational expectations where agents observe
the shocks, and restrictive perception equilibrium, where shocks are not observed which
is consistent with our experimental design. Of course, as soon as one subject departs
from rationality, the confidence interval of a rational agent should immediately become
larger as she has to account for the uncertainty of other subjects’expectations. Under
rational expectations in treatments with policy regimes p = 1, . . . , 3 higher γ leads to
lower uncertainty, while when we compare treatments with policy regimes p = 4 and
p = 1, inflation targeting and inflation forecast targeting with γ = 1.5, the former should
produce less uncertainty. These properties have testable implications.
Let us first focus on the conjecture that uncertainty should be lower when the central
bank is pursuing inflation targeting compared to inflation forecast targeting. We indeed
find that the average confidence interval is narrower in policy regime 4 compared to the
regime 1. This difference is statistically significant with standard parametric (t-test) and
nonparametric tests (Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney). If we compare treatments with regime
p = 4 separately to all the other regimes, we observe that while it is significantly narrower
than in treatments with policy regimes 1 and 2 (i.e., γ = 1.5 and γ = 1.35), the confidence
interval is wider than in treatments with policy regime 3 (γ = 4).
The second testable implication is that in treatments with inflation forecast target-
ing (p = 1, 2, 3) higher γ leads to lower uncertainty; this is also strongly confirmed by
our experimental data. Using Jonckheere-Terpstra test we find that there is descending
width of confidence intervals when we increase γ. Thus, using both parametric and non-
parametric tests we can conclude that monetary policy significantly affects the width of
the confidence interval. In specific, inflation targeting results in a narrower confidence
interval than inflation forecast targeting and that in the case of inflation forecast tar-
geting, the width of the confidence interval also depends on how strongly the monetary
13
policy is reacting to deviations of inflation from its target. One possible explanation is
that the confidence intervals depend on the variation of inflation. The variation of infla-
tion is lower in inflation targeting treatments than inflation forecast targeting treatments
with the same γ. Also treatments with policy regime 3 produce lower variability than
treatments with policy regimes 1 and 2.16 We further study this in Section 3.2.
Insert Table 3 about here
It is interesting to see how accurate experimental subjects are in determining the
confidence bounds. Thaler (2000) claims that when people are asked "for their 90%
confidence limits ... the correct answers will lie within the limits less than 70% of the
time" (p. 133).17 Our results confirm the overconfidence effect in an even stronger
manner than survey data results. Only 60.5% of the times do subjects manage to set
confidence bounds that include the actual inflation in the next period when asking for
95% confidence intervals.18 This proportion is higher in treatments Sym (64.3%) than in
treatments Asym (52.8%). It is interesting to note that the actual inflation is lower than
their confidence intervals in 19% of cases while it is higher in 20.5%. If we compare this
among treatments we find that in treatments Sym (Asym) actual inflation is lower than
their confidence intervals in 17.1% (22.9%) of cases while it is higher in 18.5% (24.4%).19
The accuracy of confidence intervals also differs across different monetary policies.
We find that in treatments with policy regime 3 (inflation forecast targeting, γ = 4)
and 4 (inflation targeting), subjects are more accurate (62.9% and 69.4% accuracy re-
spectively) than in the benchmark treatments with policy regime 1, inflation forecast
targeting with γ = 1.5 (51.7% accuracy). The differences are significantly at a 10%
level with the Wilcoxon/Mann-Whitney test. Thus monetary policy does not have only
significant effects on the width of the interval, but also on the predictive accuracy.
16Table A3 reproduces these results from Pfajfar and Žakelj (2011) in the Appendix A.
17Giordani and Söderlind (2003) for the US SPF obtain a very similar result (72%). See also Giordani
and Söderlind (2006) and Diebold, Hahn, and Tay (1999).
18As mentioned before, this is incentive compatible with 89−94% confidence intervals under restricted
perception equilibrium, depending on monetary policy regime.
19As mentioned in the introduction, this overconfidence effect has attracted a lot of attention in the
psychology literature. Some studies even document that the success rate of these forecasts is less than
50% when people are asked for 90− 99% confidence intervals (e.g. Lichtenstein, Fischhoff, and Phillips,
1982).
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As confidence intervals forecast the distribution of the expected forecast errors we
can actually dig deeper and analyze each individual separately. We find that only 11.1%
of the subjects on average overestimate risk in treatments Sym and 2.8% (1.4%) of the
subjects in treatments Asym for the lower (upper) bound. Closer inspection allows us to
conclude that on average only about 9.0% of the subjects in treatments Sym and 1.4%
(8.4%) of the subjects in treatments Asym for the lower (upper) bound report confidence
bounds that are not significantly different from 95% confidence intervals based on actual
forecast errors. The rest of the subjects on average forecast confidence bounds that are
significantly lower than the actual forecast errors.20
3.2 Determinants of individual uncertainty
Below we analyze the determinants of confidence bounds using panel data. All the regres-
sions below are estimated using the system GMM estimator of Blundell and Bond (1998)
for dynamic panel data. They are replicated for the whole sample (all), treatments
Sym (treat.Sym), and separately for the part of the interval below the point forecast
(treat.Asym-L) and above the point forecast (treat.Asym-U ) in treatments Asym. In or-
der to transform the asymmetric confidence intervals into a measure comparable to the
symmetric ones, we compute the average of the upper and lower interval.
We begin by detailing the relationship between the confidence interval and the stan-
dard deviation of inflation. We estimate the following regression:







where individual k’s current perceived uncertainty in period t, is measured by her con-
fidence interval, sipkt+1|t (for treatments Asym it is (Upper bound —Lower bound)/2).
sdjt−1 is the standard deviation of inflation up to period t− 1 for group j. The results are
reported in Table 4.
20Per-group statistics are reported in Table A1 in Appendix A, while in Table A2 the frequencies of
forecast errors depending on the inflation cycle can be found. In the Appendix B.1 we also study the
determinats of the likelihood that actual inflation falls within the specified bounds.
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Insert Table 4 about here
We find that confidence intervals are highly inertial and that higher standard deviation
of inflation leads to wider confidence intervals, although with a smaller effect in treatments
Sym.21 Table B5 in Appendix B demonstrates that if we include monetary policy dummies
in regression (5) we find that the dummy variable for treatments with monetary policy
2 is significant. One reason behind this is that uncertainty is related to the variability
of inflation, which in turn depends on γ and more generally on the monetary policy (see
Pfajfar and Žakelj, 2011).22 However, there also exist other monetary policy effects as can
be observed when controlling for a standard deviation of inflation. This means that the
relationship between monetary policy and uncertainty is not limited just to the channel
via the standard deviation of inflation.
Several studies have established that uncertainty is countercyclical. Bloom (2009)
builds a theoretical model where uncertainty shocks play a key role in business cycle
fluctuations. Also Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2006) propose an endogenous in-
formation model where macroeconomic uncertainty and dispersion in beliefs is greater
during recessions. Although our model does not exhibit such features, i.e., is perfectly
symmetric, some subjects that do not use all available information to forecast inflation
and to report uncertainty might perceive asymmetric uncertainty over the business cycle.
We estimate equation (6), where we control for the path of the output gap. In addition,
specification (6) also allows for the possibility that subjects change their interval forecasts
on the basis of their last point forecast errors:
sipkt+1|t = α + βsip
k
t|t−1 + γD1yt−1 + δD2yt−1 + εD3yt−1 (6)
+ζit−1 + ηDL |πt−1|+ θDH |πt−1|+ φ
∣∣rkt−1∣∣+ ϑT2 + ιT3 + κT4 + uemt ,
21Inertia of confidence intevals has been previously documented in the survey data literature by, e.g.,
Bruine de Bruin, Manski, Topa, and van der Klaauw (2011), and Giordani and Söderlind (2003). the
former also find a positive correlation between the self-reported range of responses and the underlying
uncertainty in US consumer data.
22Due to the presence of heterogeneous expectations this relationship is not monotonic. It is found
that the relationship between γ and the variance of inflation is under certain expectation formation
mechanisms U-shaped (see Pfajfar and Žakelj, 2011 for further details).
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where yt is the output gap, πt is actual inflation, it is the interest rate in group j.23
D1, . . . , D3 are dummy variables. D1 equals 1 when yt−1 > 0.1 and ∆yt−1 > 0 and is 0
otherwise; D2 equals 1 when yt−1 < 0.1 and ∆yt−1 < 0 and is 0 otherwise; D3 equals
1 when D1 = 0 and D2 = 0 jointly and is 0 otherwise. T2, T3 and T4 are dummies
for treatments with policy regimes 1, . . . , 3 respectively.24 DL equals 1 when inflation is
below the target and 0 otherwise, while DH equals 1 when inflation is above its target
and 0 otherwise.
Insert Table 5 about here
Results from eq. (6) are reported in Table 5, which shows that different monetary
policy rules have an effect on the width of the confidence interval as already established
above. The confidence intervals are wider for example in treatments with policy rule p = 2
compared to the treatments with other policy rules. Friedman (1968) points out that
there is a positive link between inflation and inflation uncertainty. While, for example,
Liu and Lahiri (2006) and D’Amico and Orphanides (2008) find empirical support for
this conjecture in the survey data literature, we cannot confirm it in our experiment.25
Regressing equation (6) with inflation (πt−1) instead of DL |πt−1| and DH |πt−1| would
result in inflation having a negative impact on the width of the confidence interval. The
empirical studies that find a positive correlation between inflation and uncertainty are
based on the US economy where, especially in the 70s, there was mostly an upward risk for
inflation. In our experiment, inflation fluctuates around the inflation target, so decreases
in inflation below the inflation target also increase uncertainty. With specification (6)
we concentrate on the absolute deviations of inflation from the inflation target, while
controlling for high and low inflation levels. We indeed observe that downside risk has
an even more important impact on the uncertainty than the upside risk. Moreover, when
23To ease the notation we omit superscripts j for these variables.
24Monetary policy dummies are included only in regression all as in the other specifications due to too
few observations within one treatment we would have to abolish the clustering of standard errors if we
were to include policy dummies.
25Rich and Tracy (2010) and García and Manzanares (2007), among others, study the relationship
between confidence intervals and inflation forecasts using survey data. They find mixed evidence of the
existence of the relationship. We do not find evidence in favor of this relationship (these results are
available upon request).
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inflation is above the target inflation only the upper part of the confidence interval will
be widened, whereas when it is below the target inflation both sides of the confidence
interval will be widened.
Interest rates are positively related to the individual confidence intervals in the re-
gressions above, although their effects are not significant. In Table 5 we also demonstrate
that confidence intervals positively depend on the last observed absolute forecast error.
Additionally, we confirm the asymmetries between the upper and lower confidence bound
demonstrated in Table 2. We can argue that the upper bound is more sensitive to the
stage of the business cycle than the lower bound.26
3.3 Which factors affect the choice of (a)symmetric confidence
intervals?
We have already found several asymmetries between the formation of the upper and
the lower confidence bounds in the previous section. We now turn our attention to the
choice of asymmetric confidence interval by using data from treatments Asym. Let us first
analyze the proportion of subjects that systematically choose either a wider interval above
the point forecast as compared to the one below point forecast or vice-versa. It is clear
from Table 6 that when subjects are given the option to choose an asymmetric confidence
interval they often do so, especially in treatments Asym-1 and Asym-2. Moreover, among
more than 40% of the subjects who systematically choose asymmetric intervals, fewer than
6% perceive higher uncertainty on the left-hand side of their point forecast. We can also
observe that the proportion of subjects choosing symmetric intervals is the highest in
treatment Asym-4 (inflation targeting). Table 6 shows that the behavior of subjects in
the inflation targeting treatments is more in line with theory than in the treatments with
26In the Appendix B.2 we also study subjects’ responses to inflation falling outside the confidence
interval. The results shown in Table B3 suggest that subjects increased their confidence intervals after the
last observed inflation is outside the interval. This holds for both "undershooting" and "overshooting." In
the case of "overshooting." a negative coeffi cient δ implies that confidence intervals are widened after an
"error." Confidence intervals do not change when inflation falls within the interval in the previous period.
Confidence intervals in treatments Asym exhibit less inertia, especially at the upper bound, compared
to treatments Sym. Moreover, the interval above the point forecast widens with both overshooting and
undershooting while the interval below is more stable and responds only to undershooting. This also
represents one potential source of observed asymmetries.
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inflation forecast targeting.
Insert Table 6 about here
Now we turn our attention to the factors that determine the probability of an asym-
metric interval. We first define D7 = 1 if the upper interval has exactly the same width
as the lower one and 0 otherwise. There are only about 12.5% of these cases. We observe,
that 84% of the subjects gave their responses with one or two decimal point accuracy.
It is therefore reasonable to define symmetry as |CL − CU | ≤ 0.1; in this case we set
D8 = 1. According to this definition 47.2% of our responses in treatments Asym are
approximately symmetric. We estimate the following regressions:
Dz = α + βsip
k
t|t−1 + γD1yt−1 + δD2yt−1 + εD3yt−1 + ζit−1 (7)
+ηDL |πt−1|+ θDH |πt−1|+ φsdjt−1 + uemt ; z ∈ {7, 8}.
The results for the logit fixed effects estimator are reported in the first two columns of
Table 7.27 While the above regressions inform us about the likelihood that subjects choose
symmetric intervals, they are not suitable for measuring the magnitude of the asymmetry
of the individual forecast distributions or their direction. For that purpose it is convenient
to introduce a new variable, skewness, similar to that used in Du and Budescu (2007). We
define the proxy for skewness, skwkt , by subtracting the point forecast from the midpoint
of the confidence interval. If skwkt is smaller (greater) than 0, then the interval is left
(right) skewed, and the confidence interval below the point forecast is wider (narrower)
than the one above. If skwkt = 0 then the interval is symmetric. The factors affecting
skewness are analyzed on the right-hand side of Table 7 using the Blundell-Bond system
GMM estimator.




t|t−1 + γD1yt−1 + δD2yt−1 + εD3yt−1 (8)
+ζit−1 + ηDL |πt−1|+ θDH |πt−1|+ φsdjt−1 + uemt .
27Poisson and logit random effects estimations can be found in Tables B7 and B8 in Appendix B.3.
Alternatively, we also tried different definitions of symmetry. D9 = 1 if 0.9 ≤
∣∣∣ConfIntHn−1ConfIntLn−1 ∣∣∣ ≤ 1.1. The
results can be found in Tables B7-9 in Appendix B.
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Insert Table 7 about here
Regressions for D7 and D8 demonstrate that some indicators of the cycle are signif-
icant. In particular, for D7 when the output gap is negative and downward sloping to
observe symmetric intervals it is less likely, while for D8 observing symmetrical intervals
in the opposite stage of the business cycle is more likely. For both regressions, the in-
terest rate has a significantly positive impact and absolute inflation above the target a
significantly negative impact, i.e., there is less symmetry when inflation is low.
The skewness measure, on the other hand, also gives us an indication of the direction
of the asymmetry. We find that this measure is inertial and tends to decrease (left
skewness) when the previous confidence interval was larger. The measure also varies
across the business cycles: it is lower when D3 = 1. Du and Budescu (2007) find a
negative relationship between the standard deviation of inflation and the skewness of
confidence distribution, while we find this relationship only for the case of D7.
4 Disagreement and aggregate expectation distribu-
tion
We first analyze the features of the standard deviation of point forecasts. Second, we take
account of individual uncertainty as well. We define the probability density functions of
individual distributions, add them up, and analyze the features of aggregate distribution.
4.1 Disagreement
Variance of point forecasts is a "natural" measure of disagreement. It is often used in
the empirical literature since the data on point forecasts are more frequently available
than the data on individual distributions. It is studied in the survey data literature,
for example, in Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987), Giordani and Söderlind (2003), Patton
and Timmermann (2008), and Rich and Tracy (2010). We investigate the relation of the
standard deviation of point forecasts to the phases of the economic cycle, interest rate,
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inflation and the mean forecast error:
sdvjt+1|t = α + βsdv
j
t|t−1 + γD1yt−1 + δD2yt−1 + εD3yt−1 (9)
+ζit−1 + ηDL |πt−1|+ θDH |πt−1|+ φmrjt−1 + uemt ,
where sdvjt+1|t is a cross-sectional standard deviation of point forecasts in group j at
period t, while the mean absolute forecast error in group j at period t− 1 is mrjt−1.
The regressions based on (9) are displayed on the left-hand side of Table 8. The stan-
dard deviation of point forecasts exhibits sensitivity to inflation, mean absolute forecast
error and to some degree business cycles. However it tends to be less sensitive to these
variables in treatments with asymmetric confidence intervals, where only inertia and sen-
sitivity to the business cycle play an important role. Disagreement increases when the
output gap is below the steady state and falling. We observe higher disagreement when
absolute inflation is below the target.28
Monetary policy produces significantly different median standard deviation of point
forecasts (sdv) across treatments. Wilcoxon\Mann-Whitney test suggest that among in-
flation forecast targeting treatments sdv is the highest in treatments with policy regime 2
(γ = 1.35), followed by treatments with policy regime 1 (γ = 1.5), and the lowest in treat-
ments with policy regime 3 (γ = 4). Furthermore, inflation targeting treatments (policy
regime 4) produces lower sdv than comparable inflation forecast targeting treatment (pol-
icy regime 1). There are some treatment differences regarding the determination of the
standard deviation of point forecasts (sdv). In particular, treatments with policy rule 3
seem to produce lower sdv compared to treatments with policy rule 1, therefore in the en-
vironment where monetary policy more strongly fights inflation the perceived uncertainty
is lower. However, we are not able to introduce policy rule dummies to the regressions
28Cukierman and Wachtel (1979), Rich and Tracy (2010), D’Amico and Orphanides (2008), Capistrán
and Timmermann (2009), and Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2004) find that there is a positive relationship
between inflation and disagreement. Our results conversely point out that low (below target) inflation
can also generate higher uncertainty. Carroll (2003) and Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2004) explain
this result with sticky information model. Capistrán and Timmermann (2009) and Mankiw, Reis, and
Wolfers (2004) also point out that the disagreement increaseses with the variance of current inflation.
Patton and Timmermann (2008) demonstrate for US SPF that disagreement is countercyclical, being
higher in recessions.
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for the sdv and IQR as then we would not be able to compute clustered standard errors
across treatments with different policy rules. These results are from estimations of eq.
(9) with policy rule dummies using robust standard errors.29
Insert Table 8 about here
4.2 Dispersion of aggregate distribution
Several central banks have started to put the data on the forecast distribution of eco-
nomic variables (including inflation expectations) on the agenda for policy meetings (see
e.g., recent FOMC minutes). This is partly a product of advances in Bayesian estimation
methods for monetary models and also of the adoption of new communication strategies
by many central banks (see e.g., ECBMonthly Bulletin, 2012). One option is to aggregate
individual distributions and analyze them, rather than calculate averages from the indi-
vidual moments. We derive the distribution from the asymmetric confidence bounds by
using a triangles approach similar to Engelberg, Manski, and Williams (2009). The mode
is set to be equal to the point forecast, while 95% of the derived triangular distribution
is set to be between the lower and the upper confidence bound. In this way we generate
probability density functions for each forecast by an individual. The distributions are
then aggregated (cross-sectionally) across the individuals in a group.
We choose the interquartile range (IQR), a range between the 25th and 75th per-
centile, as an appropriate measure as it is less sensitive to small variations in the tails
of the estimated density compared to the cross-sectional standard deviation of the ag-
gregate distribution.30 Nevertheless, it is useful to show that the variance of aggregate
distribution is related to the two measures that we study above. Wallis (2004, 2005)
show explicitly that the variance of the aggregate distribution can be decomposed into
the average individual uncertainty and disagreement of point forecasts. Comparing the
29Only Capistrán and Ramos-Francia (2010) have studies the relationship between monetary policy
design and disagreement. In their sample of 24 countries among which 14 inflation targeters, they found
that countries that adopted inflation targeting disagreement in long-run inflation expectation is smaller.
30Giordani and Söderlind (2003) use a similar measure to ours. In the literature other measures
have also been proposed. Boero, Smith, and Wallis (2008) use the standard deviation of the aggregate
distribution, while Batchelor and Dua (1996) suggest root mean subjective variance.
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IQR across monetary policy regimes we find analogous evidence as in the case for sdv:
among treatments with inflation forecast targeting the highest IQR is in treatments with
policy regime 2, followed by treatments with policy regime 1, and the lowest in treatments
with policy regime 3 (γ = 4). Also treatment with inflation targeting (policy regime 4)
produces lower IQR than treatments with policy regime 1. To discover the properties of
the aggregate distribution, we run the following regression:
IQRjt = α + ζIQR
j
t−1 + βD1yt−1 + γD2yt−1 + δD3yt−1 (10)
+εit−1 + ηDL |πt−1|+ θDH |πt−1|+ ηmrjt−1 + uemt ,
where IQRj = Q3−Q1 is the interquartile range, yt is the output gap, it is the interest
rate, and D1, . . . , D3 are dummy variables as identified above.
Equation (10) considers the sources of divergences in expectations, such as the output
gap, the interest rate and the previous value of the interquartile range. As above, we
introduce a dummy variable for each of the phases of the cycle. Several studies in the
survey data literature observe considerable inertia in the disagreement of expectations
(see e.g., Giordani and Söderlind, 2003). We therefore also include the previous period
interquartile range among the independent variables and find them highly significant. The
results on the right-hand side of Table 8 show that there is some influence of the cyclical
phase and inflation on the interquartile range. For a negative and decreasing output
gap there is more disagreement.31 We observe that the interquartile range is positively
correlated with the absolute level of inflation when inflation is below the target level.
In treatments Sym, the mean absolute forecast error also significantly affects the IQR.
It is worth noting that regressions for the treatments with symmetric and asymmetric
confidence intervals show very similar results. Regression results yield no significant
differences between the different monetary policy rules employed, when we control for
the above regressors.
31This is similar to the results in survey data, where it is common to observe countercyclical behavior
of variance of inflation expectations. Pfajfar and Santoro (2010) also study the kurtosis and skewness of
the distribution of forecasts and find that both exhibit procyclical behavior.
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5 Forecasting ability of different measures of infla-
tion uncertainty and disagreement
Policymakers and researchers are interested in inflation uncertainty and in obtaining
proxies for it. Therefore, the question that needs to be addressed is which measure or a
combination of them best forecasts inflation uncertainty.32 As we can observe in Table
B9, the highest correlation is between the interquartile range (IQR) and the standard
deviation of inflation (sd). It reaches almost 0.9, while somehow surprisingly disagreement
is a slightly better proxy of inflation uncertainty than the average perceived uncertainty
of subjects.33 In order to further assess the forecasting performance of these measures we
estimate the following regression:









+ζit−1 + ηπt−1 + φyt−1 + u
em
t ,
where asipjt−1 is the average confidence interval in period t−1 for group j. Table 9 reports
the results. We estimate three different specifications, which are a subset of the above
equation. In variant (a) we include all three measures, while in variant (b) we include
only measures of individual uncertainty and disagreement. Variant (c) embeds only the
IQR as it is a measure of both individual uncertainty and disagreement and, as pointed
out above, it is the measure that has the highest correlation with the standard deviation
of inflation.
Insert Table 9 about here
The regressions confirm that the average individual uncertainty and the standard
deviation of point forecasts have a positive effect on inflation variance. It comes as a
surprise however that the interquartile range has a marginally significant negative effect.
32Several studies have demonstrated that inflation uncertainty is useful for macroeconomic forecasting,
see e.g., Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2007), Söderlind (2011), and Clements (2012).
33See also correlation analysis that is reported in Appendix B.4.
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This may be due to a degree of multicollinearity between the IQR and the standard
deviation of point forecasts and/or mean confidence intervals. In specification (c) the
effect of the IQR is insignificant, while in specifications (a) and (b) we observe that only
average individual confidence interval has a positive and highly significant effect on sd.
Therefore, we can conclude that for policy maker to forecast inflation uncertainty in our
framework it is most important to know the average individual confidence interval, which
is still rarely the case in surveys of inflation opinions. These regressions reach similar
conclusions to those from the survey data literature, e.g., Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987),
Boero, Smith, and Wallis (2008), and Giordani and Söderlind (2003), who argue that
average individual uncertainty is the proxy of inflation uncertainty that central banks
should monitor.34
Inflation affects the standard deviation of inflation negatively, which might also be
surprising. However, it is likely that if we separated the positive and negative develop-
ments of inflation we would find similar effects as in the above regressions for IQR and
sdv, i.e. both terms would have significantly positive effects with negative development
having a more profound effect. The output gap exerts a negative effect on sdv.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have designed a macroeconomic experiment where subjects are asked to
forecast inflation and its uncertainty. The underlying model of the economy is a simple
NK model, which is commonly used for the analysis of monetary policy. The focus of the
analysis has been on the confidence bounds reported by subjects as a measure of perceived
uncertainty in the economy and in particular on the relationship with the monetary policy
design. It has been shown that uncertainty has implications for both inflation outcomes
and for unemployment and is an increasingly important indicator for monetary policy
making. Similarly to inflation expectations, the formation of confidence bounds has also
34According to Boero, Smith, and Wallis (2012) the usefulness of a disagreement among point forecasts
as an indicator seems to depend on the underlying macroeconomic environment. Also Lahiri and Sheng
(2010) show that the aggregate forecast uncertainty can be decomposed to the disagreement among
forecasters and the perceived variability of future aggregate shocks.
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been found to be heterogeneous.
In different treatments we have focused on various modifications of the original Taylor
rule and studied the influence of different monetary policy designs on the formation of
confidence bounds. We have found that inflation targeting produces lower uncertainty
and higher accuracy of intervals than inflation forecast targeting. The treatments with
monetary policy that reacts strongly to deviations in inflation expectations from the
inflation target also produce lower uncertainty and higher accuracy of confidence bounds,
compared to treatments with monetary policy that does not react as strongly to deviations
in inflation forecasts. This effect not only channels through the variability of inflation,
but there is also evidence that there are additional effects.
Subjects on average underestimate risk. This is a common result in the psychology
literature and is known as overconfidence bias. We have found find that only in 60.5%
of cases do subjects correctly estimate risk. In particular, fewer than 10% of subjects
on average report confidence bounds that approximately represent the 95% confidence
intervals consistent with the actual realizations; around 10% overestimate risk, while all
others underestimate risk.
We have also analyzed measures of individual uncertainty, disagreement among fore-
casters and the properties of aggregate distribution. We have found that confidence
intervals are positively related to inflation variability, that they are highly inertial and
that they widen after an "error." It is also interesting to observe the relation between
inflation and confidence intervals. We have shown that below target inflation causes the
interval to increase and absolute deviations from the inflation target is an appropriate
variable to take into account. Furthermore, we have been able to establish some facts
about the differences between the formation of lower and upper bounds. In particular,
we have found that the upper bound is more sensitive to the stage of the business cycle
while the lower bound exhibits significantly more inertia.
More generally, we have also studied the determinants of the choice of asymmetric
interval. In our treatments Asym, subjects have the possibility of choosing an asymmetric
confidence interval, while in treatments Sym they are restricted to symmetric intervals.
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We have found that in only about 12.5% of cases subjects choose symmetric intervals when
they have the possibility of choosing an asymmetric interval. Moreover, in treatments
Asym more than 35% of subjects report higher upper bounds than the lower ones, while
only about 5% of subjects show the opposite pattern. Symmetric intervals are more likely
to be observed when the interest rate is high and less likely when inflation is below the
target. Symmetric intervals are also more common when the output gap is positive and
rising compared to the opposite stage of the business cycle.
What determines the evolution of the standard deviation of point forecasts and the
interquartile range of the aggregate forecast distribution? We have documented that the
interquartile range is more inertial than the standard deviation of point forecasts, while
they both increase when inflation is below the target level. We have also compared the
forecasting performance of these measures and observed that the interquartile range of
the aggregate distribution is the one that has the highest correlation with the actual
uncertainty. Nevertheless, regression analysis suggests that the average individual confi-
dence interval is the only measure that consistently affects our forecasting specifications
significantly. More central banks should design their surveys in such a way that each
individual provides their whole distribution of forecasts or at least some measure of the
uncertainty of their forecasts. In this sense it might be enough if they were asked for their
symmetric confidence intervals as in our treatments Sym. Generally, this would greatly
enhance the informativeness of these surveys as central banks would also receive a proxy
for inflation forecast uncertainty.
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Figures and Tables
Treatments Sym-p Treatments Asym-p
policy regime p Symmetric Asymmetric
confidence interval confidence bounds
Taylor rule (equation) Parameters Groups Groups
1 —Forward looking (3) γ = 1.5 1-4 5-6
2 —Forward looking (3) γ = 1.35 7-10 11-12
3 —Forward looking (3) γ = 4 13-16 17-18
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inflation forecast confidence interval
Figure 1: Histogram of confidence intervals for all treatments, subjects and periods
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Average confidence interval All Treat. Sym Treat. Asym
(symmetric) (asymmetric)
1 —Forward looking (3), γ = 1.5 0.564 0.669 0.352
2 —Forward looking (3), γ = 1.35 0.776 0.914 0.500
3 —Forward looking (3), γ = 4 0.395 0.466 0.254
4 —Contemporaneous (4), γ = 1.5 0.430 0.410 0.471
Table 2: Width of confidence intervals across treatments. Note: The width of asymmetric




Treat. Group mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev mean stdev
Sym-1 1 2.85 5.87 0.97 0.71 - - - -
Sym-1 2 2.88 2.91 0.65 0.40 - - - -
Sym-1 3 2.92 1.97 0.70 0.35 - - - -
Sym-1 4 3.00 0.76 0.34 0.16 - - - -
Aysm-1 5 3.13 1.10 - - 0.36 0.19 0.41 0.24
Aysm-1 6 3.12 0.90 - - 0.29 0.14 0.35 0.41
Sym-2 7 3.12 0.76 1.09 0.30 - - - -
Sym-2 8 3.09 1.82 1.15 0.63 - - - -
Sym-2 9 3.13 0.51 0.38 0.21 - - - -
Sym-2 10 3.02 5.53 1.02 0.56 - - - -
Aysm-2 11 2.52 3.58 - - 0.61 0.45 0.72 0.43
Aysm-2 12 3.03 0.88 - - 0.33 0.12 0.33 0.14
Sym-3 13 3.01 0.52 0.53 0.13 - - - -
Sym-3 14 3.02 0.94 0.65 0.32 - - - -
Sym-3 15 2.99 0.24 0.35 0.09 - - - -
Sym-3 16 3.00 0.26 0.33 0.10 - - - -
Aysm-3 17 2.99 0.31 - - 0.28 0.09 0.28 0.10
Aysm-3 18 3.01 0.24 - - 0.20 0.08 0.25 0.35
Sym-4 19 3.09 0.39 0.36 0.13 - - - -
Sym-4 20 3.23 0.81 0.56 0.20 - - - -
Sym-4 21 3.05 0.48 0.38 0.09 - - - -
Sym-4 22 3.05 0.38 0.34 0.10 - - - -
Aysm-4 23 3.09 0.52 - - 0.31 0.12 0.31 0.15
Aysm-4 24 3.11 1.29 - - 0.60 0.28 0.65 0.37
All Sym 3.03 1.51 0.61 0.28 - - - -
All Asym 3.00 1.10 - - 0.37 0.18 0.41 0.28
Table 3: Confidence bounds, summary statistics.
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sipkt+1|t : all treat.Sym treat.Asym− L treat.Asym− U
sipkt|t−1 0.4390
∗∗∗ 0.5445∗∗∗ 0.4407∗∗∗ 0.0925
(0.1114) (0.0921) (0.0485) (0.0982)
sdjt−1 0.1167
∗∗∗ 0.0955∗∗ 0.1357∗∗∗ 0.2643∗∗∗
(0.0450) (0.0401) (0.0220) (0.0561)
α 0.2143∗∗∗ 0.2039∗∗∗ 0.1142∗∗∗ 0.1884∗∗∗
(0.0283) (0.0285) (0.0187) (0.0323)
N 14904 9936 4968 4968
Wald χ2(3) 140.9 259.1 346.1 34.6
Table 4: Confidence intervals and standard deviation of inflation. Note: coeffi cients are
based on the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator. Standard errors in parentheses
are calculated using bootstrap procedures (1000 replications) that take into account the
potential presence of clusters in groups. */**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent
level.
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sipkt+1|t : all treat.Sym treat.Asym− L treat.Asym− U
sipkt|t−1 0.3976
∗∗∗ 0.5333∗∗∗ 0.4305∗∗∗ 0.0900
(0.1034) (0.0990) (0.0398) (0.0997)
D1yt−1 0.0067 0.0198 0.0202 -0.0560
(0.0219) (0.0258) (0.0252) (0.0465)
D2yt−1 -0.0188 -0.0118 -0.0144 -0.0650∗∗
(0.0225) (0.0217) (0.0304) (0.0262)
D3yt−1 0.0067 0.0183 0.0051 -0.1142∗∗∗
(0.0296) (0.0271) (0.0183) (0.0413)
it−1 0.0110 0.0070 -0.0066 0.0025
(0.0076) (0.0073) (0.0059) (0.0157)
DL|πt−1| 0.0294∗∗ 0.0241∗∗ 0.0247∗∗ 0.0782∗∗∗
(0.0115) (0.0105) (0.0108) (0.0234)
DH |πt−1| 0.0180 0.0173 0.0668∗∗∗ 0.0248
(0.0167) (0.0135) (0.0139) (0.0310)
|rkt−1| 0.0552∗∗∗ 0.0473∗∗∗ 0.0474∗∗ 0.0749∗∗∗







α 0.2790 0.2062∗∗∗ 0.1694∗∗∗ 0.2898∗∗∗
(0.2893) (0.0415) (0.0266) (0.0541)
N 14688 9792 4896 4896
Wald χ2(12) 393.8 715.8 865.0 145.0
Table 5: Confidence intervals and macroeconomic variables. Note: treat.B−L (treat.B−
U) only includes the part of the interval beneath (above) the point forecast. Coeffi cients
are based on the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator. Standard errors in parentheses
are calculated using bootstrap procedures (1000 replications) that take into account the
potential presence of clusters in groups. */**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent
level.
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Lower vs. upper (% of subjects) CL < CU CL ≈ CU CL > CU
1 —Forward looking (3), γ = 1.5 44.4 50.0 5.6
2 —Forward looking (3), γ = 1.35 50.0 44.4 5.6
3 —Forward looking (3), γ = 4 33.3 66.7 0.0
4 —Contemporaneous (4), γ = 1.5 16.7 72.2 11.1
All 36.1 58.3 5.6
Table 6: Proportions of subjects from treatments Asym, depending on the difference
between their upper (CU) and lower (CL) confidence intervals. When CL < CU , the
subject chose on average a smaller lower interval than upper interval. Based on pairwise






skwkt−1 - - 0.2861
∗∗∗
(0.0576)
sipkt|t−1 0.2498 -0.7167 -0.2375
∗∗∗
(0.1643) (0.5136) (0.0852)
D1yt−1 0.3345 0.4867∗∗ -0.0496
(0.4229) (0.2048) (0.0415)
D2yt−1 -0.4418∗∗ 0.1259 -0.0447
(0.2093) (0.2308) (0.0337)
D3yt−1 -0.3388 0.1152∗∗∗ -0.0776∗∗∗
(0.2504) (0.0420) (0.0240)
it−1 0.2547∗ 0.2111∗∗∗ 0.0004
(0.1306) (0.0684) (0.0150)
DL|πt−1| 0.1828 0.1802 0.0273
(0.2757) (0.1174) (0.0275)





α - - 0.1037∗∗
(0.0519)
N 4968 4968 4968
Wald χ2(8,9) 79.3 58.3 156.3
Table 7: Determinants of symmetric and skewed intervals. Note: coeffi cients for the
symmetry tests are based on fixed effects logit estimations, while coeffi cients for skewness
are based on the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator. Standard errors in parentheses
are calculated using bootstrap procedures (1000 replications) that take into account the






all treat.Sym treat.Asym all treat.Sym treat.Asym






D1yt−1 -0.0171 0.0122 0.0157 -0.0298 -0.0282 0.0385
(0.0154) (0.0168) (0.0376) (0.0622) (0.0854) (0.0582)
D2yt−1 0.0026 0.0136 -0.1275∗∗∗ -0.0809 -0.0713 -0.1122∗∗
(0.0311) (0.0250) (0.0164) (0.0492) (0.0572) (0.0475)
D3yt−1 0.0392 0.0520 -0.0249 0.0848 0.1073 -0.0538
(0.0593) (0.0749) (0.0369) (0.0841) (0.1000) (0.0402)
it−1 0.0279 0.0249 -0.0002 0.0083 0.0076 0.0109
(0.0330) (0.0288) (0.0389) (0.0131) (0.0210) (0.0246)
DL|πt−1| 0.1430∗∗∗ 0.1533∗∗∗ 0.0773 0.0758∗∗ 0.0789∗∗∗ 0.0497
(0.0507) (0.0353) (0.0534) (0.0294) (0.0286) (0.0345)
DH |πt−1| 0.0787 0.0901 0.0794 0.0438 0.0492 0.0022
(0.0717) (0.0701) (0.0675) (0.0530) (0.0615) (0.0401)
mrjt−1 0.2211
∗∗∗ 0.2447∗∗∗ 0.0704 0.2174∗∗∗ 0.2438∗∗∗ 0.0790
(0.0297) (0.0169) (0.0779) (0.0348) (0.0184) (0.0959)
α -0.0218 -0.0252 0.0332 0.0739∗∗ 0.0836 0.0668
(0.0911) (0.0726) (0.1211) (0.0308) (0.0610) (0.0750)
N 1632 1088 544 1632 1088 544
Wald χ2(8) 3763.3 12747.1 5495.4 19215.1 15228.4 3032.3
Table 8: Analysis of Disagreement: Interquartile Range (left) and Standard Deviation of
Point Forecasts (right). Note: coeffi cients are based on the Blundell-Bond system GMM
estimator. Standard errors in parentheses are calculated using bootstrap procedures
(1000 replications) that take into account the potential presence of clusters in treatments.
*/**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent level.
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it−1 0.0108 0.0108 0.0129
(0.0084) (0.0082) (0.0096)
πt−1 -0.0135 -0.0136 -0.0148
(0.0118) (0.0115) (0.0137)
yt−1 -0.0094∗ -0.0092∗ -0.0125∗∗∗
(0.0052) (0.0049) (0.0037)
α -0.0109 -0.0071 0.0169
(0.0227) (0.0218) (0.0178)
N 1656 1656 1656
Wald χ2(7,6,5) 54840.3 50525.4 22529.2
Table 9: Factors affecting the standard deviation of inflation. Note: coeffi cients are
based on the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator. Standard errors in parentheses
are calculated using bootstrap procedures (1000 replications) that take into account the
potential presence of clusters in treatments. */**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1
percent level.




Treat Group < ≈ > < ≈ > < ≈ >
Sym-1 1 100 0 0 - - - - - -
Sym-1 2 78 11 11 - - - - - -
Sym-1 3 89 11 0 - - - - - -
Sym-1 4 78 22 0 - - - - - -
Aysm-1 5 - - - 89 11 0 0 22 78
Aysm-1 6 - - - 100 0 0 0 11 89
Sym-2 7 44 11 44 - - - - - -
Sym-2 8 78 11 11 - - - - - -
Sym-2 9 100 0 0 - - - - - -
Sym-2 10 100 0 0 - - - - - -
Aysm-2 11 - - - 100 0 0 0 0 100
Aysm-2 12 - - - 100 0 0 0 0 100
Sym-3 13 56 22 22 - - - - - -
Sym-3 14 89 11 0 - - - - - -
Sym-3 15 56 11 33 - - - - - -
Sym-3 16 100 0 0 - - - - - -
Aysm-3 17 - - - 100 0 0 0 0 100
Aysm-3 18 - - - 100 0 0 0 11 89
Sym-4 19 78 11 11 - - - - - -
Sym-4 20 89 11 0 - - - - - -
Sym-4 21 67 0 33 - - - - - -
Sym-4 22 78 11 11 - - - - - -
Aysm-4 23 - - - 78 0 22 11 11 78
Aysm-4 24 - - - 100 0 0 0 11 89
All 80 9 11 96 1 3 1 8 90
Table A1: Percentage of subjects by group with underprediction/overprediction of con-
fidence interval. Note: the benchmark confidence level is 1.96 ∗ sdkt−1. < (>) identifies
frequencies of subjects whose inputs are signiffi cantly lower (higher) than the benchmark
value. ≈ identifies subjects whose input is not siggnificantly different from the bench-
mark. Based on t-tests.
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All treatments Sym treatments Asym
Inflation ↑ ↓ ∼ ↑ ↓ ∼ ↑ ↓ ∼
Underprediction 34.63 3.98 17.83 30.93 4.12 16.79 41.39 3.69 20.02
Inside interval 60.65 58.41 63.95 64.81 62.75 66.43 53.03 49.15 58.76
Overprediction 4.72 37.6 18.22 4.25 33.13 16.79 5.58 47.17 21.22
Table A2: Interval correctness depending on the phase of the inflation cycle (% of de-
cisions). ↑ denotes cases when inflation increases for at least the last 2 periods, and ↓
denotes cases when it decreases for at least the last 2 periods. ∼ represents all other
cases. Subjects "underpredict" when the actual inflation is larger than their predicted
upper confidence bound; and "overpredict" when the actual inflation is lower than their
predicted lower confidence bound.
Mean Median Comparison
standard standard with treat. 1
Monetary Policy Regime Groups deviation deviation (p-value)
1: Inf. forc. targ. γ = 1.5 1− 6 2.24 1.52 −
2: Inf. forc. targ. γ = 1.35 7− 12 2.17 1.35 0.6310
3: Inf. forc. targ. γ = 4 13− 18 0.42 0.29 0.0104
4: Inf. targeting γ = 1.5 19− 24 0.64 0.50 0.0250
Table A3: Standard deviation of inflation for each treatment and Kruskal-Wallis test of
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Figure A1: Average inflation forecasts and average confidence intervals (left axis) and
disagreement and uncertainty measures (right axis) per group. Interquartile range is
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Figure A2: Average inflation forecasts and average confidence intervals (left axis) and
disagreement and uncertainty measures (right axis) per group. Interquartile range is
calculated from the aggregate expectation distribution as described in Section 4.1.
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B Additional analysis (not for publication)
B.1 Forecasting accuracy
We check how the volatility of inflation, the width of confidence bounds, and macroeco-
nomic variables affect the likelihood of inflation falling within the specified confidence
bound. We estimate the following regression, where xkt takes value 1 when inflation falls
within the provided bounds and 0 otherwise:
xkt = α
k + βsipkt|t−1 + γD1yt−1 + δD2yt−1 + εD3yt−1 + (12)
+ηDL |πt−1|+ θDH |πt−1|+ ζit−1 + δsdjt−1 + uemt ,




D1yt−1 -0.8720∗∗∗ -1.1590∗∗∗ -0.7103∗∗∗
(0.2117) (0.4328) (0.2137)
D2yt−1 1.3565∗∗∗ 1.9346∗∗∗ 1.4602∗∗∗
(0.2304) (0.5309) (0.2439)
D3yt−1 0.3092∗ 0.3000 0.2717
(0.1684) (0.3153) (0.2023)
DL|πt−1| 0.2179∗∗ 0.0933 0.3218∗
(0.0948) (0.5938) (0.1856)
DH |πt−1| 0.5955∗∗∗ 1.2236∗∗ 0.5659∗∗∗
(0.1344) (0.4821) (0.1497)





N 14628 4968 9660
Wald χ2(8) 168.4 230.0 122.9
Table B1: Forecasting accuracy and confidence intervals. Note: coeffi cients are based
on fixed effects logit estimations. Standard errors in parentheses are calculated using
bootstrap procedures (1000 replications) that take into account the potential presence of
clusters in groups. */**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent level.
The results for fixed effects logit estimation are reported in Table B1 while those for
Poisson fixed effects and random effects are reported in the working paper version (results
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remain virtually unchanged). As one would expect, when there is a higher volatility of
inflation there are more results outside the interval, especially in treatments Asym. This
is well documented in the psychology literature as greater volatility leads to overconfi-
dence (e.g., Lawrence and Makridakis, 1989, Lawrence and O’Connor, 1992).35 However,
some studies also find that there is no such effect (Du and Budescu, 2007). In both treat-
ments wider confidence intervals result in a higher probability of correctly specifying the
confidence interval. Interestingly, we can observe that there exists some pattern across
business cycles. There are more outcomes outside the interval, when the output gap is
positive and has a clear upward trend of inflation, while in the opposite situation there is
a lower probability of misperceiving inflation uncertainty. Inflation also has a significant
positive impact on the likelihood of the forecast falling within the interval, especially
when inflation is above the target value.
In Table B2 we also report the results of the relationship between the individual k’s
forecast error rkt+1 = π
k
t+1|t−πt+1, and the confidence interval as a measure of uncertainty:







rkt+1 : all treat.Sym treat.Asym− L treat.Asym− U
rkt 0.6970
∗∗∗ 0.6757∗∗∗ 0.8521∗∗∗ 0.8524∗∗∗
(0.1376) (0.1596) (0.0250) (0.0254)
sipkt+1|t 0.0559 0.0812 0.6387
∗∗∗ -0.1139∗
(0.0928) (0.1102) (0.1980) (0.0619)
α -0.0211 -0.0401 -0.2016∗∗∗ -0.0076
(0.0513) (0.0651) (0.0468) (0.0299)
N 14688 9792 4896 4896
Wald χ2(3) 26.7 21.4 6625.1 4809.6
Table B2: Forecast errors and confidence intervals. Note: coeffi cients are based on the
Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator. Standard errors in parentheses are calculated us-
ing bootstrap procedures (1000 replications) that take into account the potential presence
of clusters in groups. */**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent level.
35Psychologists argue that this overconfidence is due to hard-easy effects, i.e. miscalibration (reported
narrower confidence intervals) is higher in hard tasks and attenuated or even eliminated in easy tasks
(e.g. Keren, 1991).
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B.2 Determinants of individual confidence intervals
A second feature of the confidence intervals that we want to study is the subjects’re-
sponses to inflation falling outside the confidence interval. To discriminate between the
effects of overshooting and undershooting we introduce two dummy variables. Dk4 takes
value 1 if
(∣∣rkt−1∣∣ > sipkt−1) ∧ (rkt−1 ≥ 0), and 0 otherwise. Note that rkt−1 = πt−1−πkt−1|t−2
is subject k’s last observed forecast error. Dk5 equals 1 if
(∣∣rkt−1∣∣ > sipkt−1) ∧ (rkt−1 ≤ 0),
and 0 otherwise, while Dk6 is 1 when
∣∣rkt−1∣∣ < sipkt−1, and 0 otherwise. Therefore Dk4 = 1
when subject k underestimates inflation; while Dk5 = 1 when subject k overestimates
inflation. We run the following regression:

















sipkt+1|t : all treat.Sym treat.Asym− L treat.Asym− U
sipkt|t−1 0.4430
∗∗∗ 0.5496∗∗∗ 0.4641∗∗∗ 0.1068




∗∗ 0.0292∗∗ 0.0023 0.0669∗




∗∗∗ -0.0647∗∗∗ -0.0955∗∗∗ -0.0668∗∗
(0.0193) (0.0190) (0.0094) (0.0269)
D6r
k
t−1 0.0015 0.0025 -0.0191
∗ 0.0506
(0.0201) (0.0204) (0.0107) (0.0309)
α 0.2799∗∗∗ 0.2568∗∗∗ 0.1882∗∗∗ 0.3504∗∗∗
(0.0396) (0.0416) (0.0251) (0.0406)
N 14688 9792 4896 4896
Wald χ2(5) 203.6 248.5 1048.1 19.7
Table B3: Confidence intervals and phases of the economic cycle. Note: treat.B −
L (treat.B − U) only includes part of the interval beneath (above) the point forecast.
Coeffi cients are based on the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator. Standard errors in
parentheses are calculated using bootstrap procedures (1000 replications) that take into
account the potential presence of clusters in groups. */**/*** denotes significance at
10/5/1 percent level.
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The results shown in Table B3 suggest that subjects increased their confidence in-
tervals after the last observed inflation is outside the interval.36 This holds for both
"undershooting" and "overshooting." In the latter case rkt−1 is negative, so a negative
coeffi cient δ implies that confidence intervals are widened after
∣∣rkt−1∣∣ > sipkt−1. Positive
or negative errors do not result in any significant change in confidence intervals in the
next period when inflation falls within the interval. It is also interesting to note that
the confidence intervals in treatments Asym exhibit less inertia, especially at the upper
bound, compared to treatments Sym. Moreover, the interval above the point forecast
widens with both overshooting and undershooting while the interval below is more sta-
ble and responds only to undershooting. This also represents the first potential source
of observed asymmetries. Ben-David, Graham, and Harvey (2010) also note that there
is a difference regarding the formation of the upper and the lower bound of confidence
intervals. They argue that lower forecast bounds are significantly affected by the past
return while upper ones are not.
Additionally, we also report robustness of the results in the text in the next 3 tables.
sipkt+1|t : all treat.Sym treat.Asym− L treat.Asym− U
sipkt|t−1 0.4472
∗∗∗ 0.5530∗∗∗ 0.4468∗∗∗ 0.0991
(0.1058) (0.0817) (0.0418) (0.1038)
sdvjt−1 0.1119
∗∗ 0.0993∗∗∗ 0.1472∗∗∗ 0.2929∗∗∗
(0.0448) (0.0373) (0.0322) (0.0788)
α 0.2596∗∗∗ 0.2356∗∗∗ 0.1665∗∗∗ 0.2902∗∗∗
(0.0366) (0.0360) (0.0277) (0.0300)
N 14904 9936 4968 4968
Wald χ2(2) 58.9 129.8 114.6 65.5
Table B4: Confidence intervals and standard deviation of point forecasts. Note: the






t . Coeffi cients
are based on the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator. Standard errors in parentheses
are calculated using bootstrap procedures (1000 replications) that take into account the
potential presence of clusters in groups. */**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent
level.




















Table B5: Confidence intervals and standard deviation of inflation Note: coeffi cients are
based on the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator. Standard errors in parentheses
are calculated using bootstrap procedures (1000 replications) that take into account the
potential presence of clusters in groups. */**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent
level.
sipkt+1|t : all treat.Sym treat.Asym− L treat.Asym− U
sipkt|t−1 0.4636
∗∗∗ 0.5719∗∗∗ 0.4780∗∗∗ 0.1090
(0.1028) (0.0726) (0.0532) (0.1072)
Dk4 0.0364
∗ 0.0228 0.0054 0.0788∗∗
(0.0215) (0.0263) (0.0121) (0.0320)
Dk5 0.0669
∗∗∗ 0.0656∗∗ 0.0735∗∗∗ 0.0261
(0.0233) (0.0295) (0.0216) (0.0264)
α 0.2718∗∗∗ 0.2489∗∗∗ 0.1802∗∗∗ 0.3480∗∗∗
(0.0376) (0.0364) (0.0264) (0.0400)
N 14688 9792 4896 4896
Wald χ2(3) 59.0 127.2 138.5 14.5
Table B6: Confidence intervals and the effect of forecast errors. Note: the table is








t . Coeffi cients are
based on the Blundell-Bond system GMM estimator. Standard errors in parentheses
are calculated using bootstrap procedures (1000 replications) that take into account the
potential presence of clusters in groups. */**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent
level.
B.3 Determinants of symmetric confidence intervals
Tables B7 and B8 report results of the following regressions:
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Dz = α + βsip
k
t|t−1 + γD1yt−1 + δD2yt−1 + εD3yt−1 + ζit−1
+ηDL |πt−1|+ θDH |πt−1|+ φsdjt−1 + uemt ; z ∈ {7, 8, 9},
where D7 = 1 if the CU = CL and 0 otherwise, D8 = 1 when |CL − CU | ≤ 0.1, and D9 = 1
when 0.9 6
∣∣∣ConfIntHn−1ConfIntLn−1 ∣∣∣ 6 1.1.
logit D7 D8 D9 D9, fe
sipkt|t−1 0.2178 -1.0233
∗ -0.0194 0.0581
(0.1957) (0.6213) (0.2968) (0.2239)
D1yt−1 0.2836 0.4825∗∗ -0.0122 -0.0028
(0.4162) (0.2245) (0.2913) (0.2846)
D2yt−1 -0.3912∗ 0.1116 -0.0490 -0.0605
(0.2058) (0.2339) (0.1847) (0.1859)
D3yt−1 -0.3436 0.1057∗∗ -0.0277 -0.0288
(0.2645) (0.0441) (0.1667) (0.1508)
DL|πt−1| 0.2375∗ 0.2203∗∗∗ 0.1635 0.1629
(0.1354) (0.0720) (0.1163) (0.1143)
DH |πt−1| 0.1510 0.1858 0.1494 0.1588
(0.2850) (0.1214) (0.1929) (0.1842)
it−1 -0.4047 -0.2827∗∗ -0.2041 -0.1969
(0.2570) (0.1204) (0.1660) (0.1637)
sdkt−1 -0.1318 -0.4759
∗ -0.2817∗∗ -0.3295∗
(0.1381) (0.2477) (0.1330) (0.1905)
α -2.8695∗∗∗ -0.1098 -1.5233∗∗∗ -
(0.4649) (0.3313) (0.4104)
ln(σ2u) -0.4665 -1.1088 -0.7481 -
(0.2516) (0.2653) (0.2443)
σu 0.7920 0.5744 0.6879 -
(0.0996) (0.0762) (0.0840)
ρ∗ 0.1601 0.0911 0.1258 -
(0.0338) (0.0220) (0.0269)
N 4968 4968 4968 4968
Wald χ2(8) 48.3 72.3 29.2 34.0
Table B7: Determinants of symmetric intervals. Note: coeffi cients are based on random
effects logit estimations, except for "D9, fe", which is based on fixed effects logit esti-
mation. Standard errors in parentheses are calculated using bootstrap procedures (1000
replications) that take into account the potential presence of clusters in groups. */**/***
denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent level.
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Poisson D7 D8 D9 D9, fe
sipkt|t−1 0.1717 -0.7314
∗∗ -0.0307 0.0443
(0.1412) (0.3667) (0.2476) (0.1641)
D1yt−1 0.2215 0.2141∗ -0.0092 0.0032
(0.3388) (0.1165) (0.2046) (0.1989)
D2yt−1 -0.2974∗ 0.0625 -0.0298 -0.0491
(0.1598) (0.1137) (0.1276) (0.1301)
D3yt−1 -0.2727 0.0704∗ -0.0106 -0.0147
(0.2216) (0.0392) (0.1234) (0.1050)
DL|πt−1| 0.1922∗ 0.1043∗∗ 0.1114 0.1106
(0.1092) (0.0408) (0.0820) (0.0801)
DH |πt−1| 0.1141 0.0917 0.1004 0.1146
(0.2330) (0.0759) (0.1411) (0.1353)
it−1 -0.3303 -0.1336∗∗ -0.1413 -0.1298
(0.2126) (0.0619) (0.1146) (0.1115)
sdjt−1 -0.0802 -0.2374
∗∗∗ -0.1933∗∗ -0.2476∗∗
(0.1356) (0.0906) (0.0841) (0.1203)
α -2.6585∗∗∗ -0.6834∗∗∗ -1.6007∗∗∗ -
(0.3787) (0.1597) (0.2862)
ln(α∗) -0.8804∗∗∗ -2.8617∗∗∗ -1.5552∗∗∗ -
(0.2106) (0.9207) (0.2275)
α∗ 0.4146 0.0572 0.2111 -
(0.0873) (0.0526) (0.0480)
N 4968 4968 4968 4968
Wald χ2(8) 40.3 71.3 21.9 27.4
Table B8: Determinants of symmetric intervals. Note: coeffi cients are based on random
effects Poisson estimations, except for "D9, fe", which is based on fixed effects logit
estimation. Standard errors in parentheses are calculated using bootstrap procedures
(1000 replications) that take into account the potential presence of clusters in groups.
*/**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1 percent level.
B.4 Comparison of different measures: correlation analysis
The aim of this section is to compare different measures of individual uncertainty and
disagreement among forecasters. Various studies argue that disagreement measured as
the standard deviation of point forecasts lacks a theoretical basis and is therefore not a
suitable proxy for uncertainty and consequently also for inflation variability, as is implicit
in Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987). However, as we pointed out above, Boero, Smith, and
Wallis (2008) question this statement and show that disagreement is a component of the
variance of aggregate distribution.
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There are several advantages and disadvantages to each measure proposed. The choice
of the measure should therefore be oriented to the purpose for which it is intended. Several
survey data articles point out that the advantage of the measure of disagreement among
forecasters (sdv) is that it is available in any survey, whereas only a limited number of
surveys asks for measures of individual uncertainty. Our design thus allows us to also use
average confidence interval (asip) for comparison. A proxy for the uncertainty may be
the average absolute forecast error across individuals (mr). A measure of the variation
in the aggregate distribution of forecasts gives information about both uncertainty and
disagreement. The interquartile range (IQR) is a proxy for that. Figures A1 and A2 in
Appendix A display a timewise comparison between the average confidence interval, the
standard deviation of point forecasts and the interquartile range for each group.
We compare pairwise correlation coeffi cients between different measures of uncertainty
and disagreement as in D’Amico and Orphanides (2008) to make a preliminary assess-















∗∗∗ 0.689∗∗∗ 0.777∗∗∗ 1
πt+1 -0.080∗∗ -0.030 -0.063∗ -0.131∗∗∗ 1
it+1 0.169∗∗∗ 0.196∗∗∗ 0.226∗∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗ 0.845∗∗∗ 1
yt+1 -0.321∗∗∗ -0.246∗∗∗ -0.259∗∗∗ -0.267∗∗∗ -0.016 -0.177∗∗∗ 1
sdjt+1 0.818
∗∗∗ 0.690∗∗∗ 0.722∗∗∗ 0.877∗∗∗ -0.143∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ -0.280∗∗∗
Table B9: Pairwise correlation coeffi cients. Note: */**/*** denotes significance at 10/5/1
percent level.
All three measures that we compare in this section are significantly positively corre-
lated between each other and with the standard deviation of inflation. However, some
of the correlation coeffi cients are not very high. As we can observe in Table B9, there
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is a significant correlation coeffi cient (about 0.5) between the average width of the confi-
dence interval and the standard deviation of point forecasts.37 Rich and Tracy (2010) and
Boero, Smith, and Wallis (2008) find little evidence that this relationship exists in the
survey data, while D’Amico and Orphanides (2008) find a correlation coeffi cient of 0.4.
The present analysis suggests that uncertainty and disagreement are modestly correlated.
A positive correlation between the interquartile range and individual uncertainty can
be observed. The correlation coeffi cient (around 0.7) is higher than that reported in the
previous paragraph. As shown in the statistical analysis by Boero, Smith, and Wallis
(2008), there exists a "structural" relationship between these two variables so a positive
relationship is expected. For similar reasons there is also a correlation between the
disagreement and the interquartile range. The latter correlation is of similar magnitude
to the former. Therefore, one could argue that the interquartile range is in our experiment
at least as much, if not more, a measure of disagreement as average individual uncertainty.
Bomberger (1996) argues that the standard deviation of point forecasts is a useful proxy
for uncertainty and that disagreement tracks uncertainty better than the GARCH model;
however, this view is questioned by Rich and Butler (1998).38
37Table B4 in Appendix B depicts the relationship between confidence bounds and the dispersion of
point forecasts in more detail. We find no evidence of this relationship for symmetric intervals, while for
asymmetric there is a positive relationship.
38Lahiri and Sheng (2010) point out that disagreement is useful for forecasting in stable periods but
not in periods of high volatility.
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C Confidence intervals under Rational Expectations
To calculate the standard deviation of inflation forecast uncertainty under Rational Ex-
pectations (RE), we have to first define the perceived law of motion (PLM) of the RE
equilibrium form (under the assumption of homogeneous expectations):
Etπt+1 = R0 +R1yt−1 +R2gt−1 +R3ut−1, (15)
where all coeffi cients R are calculated using the method of undetermined coeffi cients. See
our companion paper for details (Pfajfar and Žakelj, 2011). Note that Etπt+1 are inflation
forecast made in t with information from t − 1 for period t + 1.39 To calculate inflation
forecast uncertainty we have to feed forward for one period the equations (1), (2), (15)
and the relevant monetary policy rule (either (3) or (4) depending for which regime we
are calculating it). Then we insert (15), (1) and policy rule into the forwarded (1) and
the resulting equation into the (2). We thus obtain the actual law of motion (ALM)
for inflation. The unobservable part of the shock of this ALM represents the inflation
forecast uncertainty. Thus, the standard deviation of forecast uncertainty for policy rules
p = 1, ..., 3 is:
σk =
√(
(C(R1 +R2) + λ(1 + κ))2 + λ
2
)
σ2g + ((C ·R3 + ν)2 + 1)σ2u,
C = λϕ(1− γ) + β.
where σk is the standard deviation of inflation forecast uncertainty of the forecaster
k, who uses rational expectations to forecast inflation. Standard deviation of forecast
39In this and the next section we denote Etπt+1 made by a forecaster k as πk.
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3 + (1− C1ϕγ)2)σ2u,
C1 = λ/(1 + ϕγλ),
C2 = C1κ+ C
2
1/λ+ (C1ϕ(1− γβ) + β) (R2 + C1R1/λ) ,
C3 = ν(1− C1ϕγ)− C21ϕγ/λ+ (C1ϕ(1− γβ) + β) (R3 − C1ϕγR1/λ) .
Numerical values are reported in Table D1.
D Properties of the payoff function
In this Appendix we study the properties of the payoff functionW2. Profit, conditional on






Probability that the actual value π falls within a confidence interval CI from the
forecasted value, πk :




where f (x) is a probability density function of a forecasting error, x = πk − π, and F (x)
a corresponding cumulative density function. Expected profits, EW , are therefore:







(F (CI)− F (−CI)) .
Maximization condition is thus:
∂EW2
∂d
= W ′2 · PW +W2 · P ′W = 0.
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For the rational expectations and the restricted perception equilibrium forecast errors
are distributed normally, f (πk − π) ∼ N(0, σ2k). σ2k is computed in Appendix C and is



































































































Solving this equation for confidence intervals, CI∗ under RE for different treatments
gives us the following values:
Taylor rule (equation) Parameters σk CI∗ ICMP ∗
1 —Forward looking (3) γ = 1.5 0.3511 0.5050 85%
2 —Forward looking (3) γ = 1.35 0.4161 0.5633 82%
3 —Forward looking (3) γ = 4 0.1647 0.2958 93%
4 —Contemporaneous (4) γ = 1.5 0.2740 0.4272 88%
Table D1: Incentive compatibility of the payoff function under Rational Expectations
From PW we can also deduct the percentage of cases where the actual inflation fall
within the confidence bounds when this function is maximized (ICMP ∗) . We can also
study incentive compatibility under restrictive perception equilibrium, where agents, as
in our experiment do not observe the shocks (but is otherwise of the same form as rational
expectations equilibrium). Under this expectation formation mechanism the results are
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the following:
Taylor rule (equation) Parameters σk CI∗ ICMP ∗
1 —Forward looking (3) γ = 1.5 0.2273 0.3768 90%
2 —Forward looking (3) γ = 1.35 0.2587 0.4175 89%
3 —Forward looking (3) γ = 4 0.1397 0.2575 94%
4 —Contemporaneous (4) γ = 1.5 0.1953 0.3350 91%
Table D2: Incentive compatibility of the payoff function under Restrictive Perception
Equlibria
E Instructions for the experiment (not for publica-
tion)
Thank you for participating in this experiment, a project of economic investigation. Your
earnings depend on your decisions and the decisions of the other participants. There is
a show up fee of 5 Euros assured. From now on until the end of the experiment you are
not allowed to communicate with each other. If you have any questions raise your hand
and one of the instructors will answer the question in private. Please do not ask aloud.
The experiment
All participants receive exactly the same instructions. You and 8 other subjects all
participate as agents in the same fictitious economy. You will have to predict future
values of given economic variables. The experiment consists of 70 periods. The rules are
the same in all the periods. You will interact with the same 8 subjects during the whole
experiment.
Imagine that you work in a firm where you have to predict inflation for the next
period. Your earnings depend on the accuracy of your inflation expectation.
Information in each period
The economy will be described with 3 variables in this experiment: the inflation rate, the
output gap, and the interest rate.
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• Inflation measures a general rise in prices in the economy. In each period it
depends on the inflation expectations of the agents in economy (you and the other
8 participants in this experiment), the output gap and random shocks which have
equal probability of having a positive or negative effect on inflation and are normally
distributed.
• The output gapmeasures by how much (in percentage) the actual Gross Domestic
Product differs from the potential one. If the output gap is greater than 0, it means
that the economy is producing more than the potential level, if negative, less than
the potential level. In each period it depends on the inflation expectations of the
agents in the economy, the past output gap, the interest rate and random shocks
which have equal probability of having a positive or negative effect on inflation and
are normally distributed.
• The interest rate is (in this experiment) the price of borrowing money (in per-
centage) for one period. The interest rate is set by the monetary authority. Their
decision mostly depends on the inflation expectations of the agents in the economy.
All given variables might be relevant to your inflation forecast, but it is up to you
to work out their relation and the possible benefit of knowing them. The evolution of
the variables will partly depend on your and the other subjects’inputs and also different
exogenous shocks influencing the economy.
• You enter the economy in period 1. In this period you will be given computer-
generated past values of inflation, the output gap and the interest rate for 10 periods
back (Called: -9, -8, . . . -1, 0)
• In period 2 you will be given all the past values as seen in period 1 plus the value
from period 1 (Periods: -9, -8, . . . 0, 1).
• In period 3 you will see all the past values as in period 2 (Periods: -9, -8, . . . 1, 2)
plus YOUR prediction about inflation in period 2 that you made in period 1.
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• In period t you will see all the past values of actual inflation up to period t − 1
(Periods: -9, -8, . . . t− 2, t− 1) and your predictions up to period t− 1 (Periods:
2, 3, . . . t− 2, t− 1).
What do you have to decide?
Your task is to predict the state of the economy as accurately as possible. Your payoff
will depend on the accuracy of your prediction of the inflation in the future period. In
each period your prediction will consist of two parts:
a) Expected inflation, (in percentage) that you expect to be in the NEXT period
(Exp.Inf.)
b) Lower bound (in percentage) of your prediction. You must be almost sure that the
actual inflation will be higher than your lower bound.
c) Upper bound (in percentage) of your prediction. You must be almost sure that the
actual inflation will be lower than your upper bound.
Based on b) and c) we determine the confidence interval, Conf.Int. which is equal to
Conf.Int. = Upper bound − Lower bound
Example 1 Let’s say you think that inflation in the next period will be 3.7%. And you
also think it is most likely (95% probability) that the actual inflation will not be lower
than 3.2% and not higher than 4.0%. Your inputs in the experiment will be 3.7 under a),
3.2 under b), and 4.0 under c).














where Exp.Inf. is your expectation about the inflation in the NEXT period, Conf.Int.
is the confidence interval, Inflation is the actual inflation in the next period and x is a
63
variable with value 1 if
Lower bound ≤ Inflation ≤ Upper bound
and 0 otherwise.
The first part of the payoff function states that you will receive some payoff if the
actual value in the next period differs from your prediction in this period by less than
4 percentage points. The smaller this difference is, the higher the payoff you receive.
With a zero forecast error (|Inflation− Exp.Inf.| = 0), you would receive 80 units
(100/1 − 20). However, if your forecast is 1 percentage point higher or lower than the
actual inflation rate, you will get only 30 units (100/2 − 20). If your forecast error is 4
percentage points or more, you will receive 0 units (100/5− 20).
The second part of the payoff function simply states that you will get some extra
payoff if the actual inflation is within your expected interval and if that interval is not
larger than 8 percentage points. The more certain of the actual value you are, the smaller
interval you give (Lower bound and Upper bound closer to Exp.Inf.), and the higher will
be your payoff if the actual inflation is indeed in the given interval, but there will also be
higher chances that the actual value will fall outside your interval. In our example this
interval was 0.8 percentage points. If the actual inflation falls in this interval you receive
51.4 units (100/(1 + 1
2
0.8)− 20) in addition to the payoff from the first part of the payoff
function. If the actual values is outside your interval, your receive 0.
On the attached sheet you will find a table showing various combinations of forecast
error and confidence interval needed to earn a given number of points.
Information after each period
Your payoff depends on your predictions for the next period and the actual realization in
the next period. Because the actual inflation will be known only in the next period, you
will also be informed about you current period (t) prediction and earnings after the end
of the NEXT period (t+ 1). Therefore:
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• After period 1 you will not receive any earnings, since you did not make any pre-
diction for period 1.
• In any other period, you will receive information about the actual inflation rate in
this period and your inflation and confidence interval prediction from the previous
period. You will also be informed if the actual inflation value was in your expected
interval and what your earnings are for this period.
The units in the experiment are fictitious. Your actual payoff (in euros) will be the
sum of earnings from all periods divided by 500.
If you have any questions please ask them now!
Questionnaire40
1. If you believe that inflation in the next period will be _ _4.2%_ _, and you are
quite sure that it will not go down by more than _ _ 0.4_ _ nor up by more than
_ _ 0.7_ _, you will type:
Under (1) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ for inflation,
Under (2) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ for the lower bound, and
Under (3) _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ for the upper bound.
2. You are now in period _ _ _ _15_ _ _ _. You have information about past
inflation, the output gap and the interest rate up to period _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
_ and you have to predict the inflation for period _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _.
40Options (1), (2) and (3) point to the different fields on the screenshot of the experimental interface.
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